Autor: Ondřej Novotný (Katedra amerických studií IMS FSV UK)

Introduction

Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher are rightly considered as two of the greatest opponents of communism in modern history. They are perceived as a steely union of highly committed people who helped to bring the Soviet Union to its knees. Their joint efforts to economically exhaust USSR met with great success because Reagan´s arm race helped to destroy the Soviets financially. Their legacy also invokes the union of two statements who had none or only few minor disputes. They are celebrated for their unity and the stoutness of their personal friendship. They led the anti-communist bloc and many times had the same opinions. As such they are presented as an ideal example of two politicians leading their respective countries to inevitable victory in the quest for ideological dominance. But was their relationship absent of conflicts? Were there not at least some disputes? Can be the Reagan-Thatcher duo portrayed only in pink colors without black stains?

In my essay I will focus on responding to the aforementioned questions. In my effort to do so I will use one case study of the Siberian Gas Pipeline, which had broader connections to energy security in Western Europe, the Polish crisis in 1981-82 and American economic policies towards the USSR. I will use mainly primary sources supported by similar studies on the same topic conducted by prominent figures in the international relations field.

 

Events in Poland in 1981-82

Poland in 1970s.

At the end of the 1970s Poland was experiencing its worst economic conditions since the country had become a socialist state. Even the top leaders were aware of this fact and openly admitted it. Despite being coal rich country, its cities were affected by power cuts, railways were in total chaos, goods typical for western markets were not available, and people had to wait for 8 or more years to get a flat, which was provided by government. In such dire economic and social conditions a lot of politicians were afraid that minor incident, might cause a “volcano” of anger peaking in wide-spread demonstrations, strikes and acts of violence against the official authorities.

Protests, crackdowns, solidarity

What many predicted as inevitable turned out into reality in the summer 1980. First strikes began on the railways, followed by strikes of bus drivers and delivery men.[1] However, more threatening demonstrations came from the Gdansk´s shipyard workers. As much as 60.000 of them walked through the city in August demanding an increase in wages and freely elected workers´ committees. Other walkouts followed.[2] This wave of unrest forced the government to sign deals with workers´ representatives concerning their demands (including others pay increases, better food conditions, independent labor unions, etc.) and give them the right to strike and demonstrate. With these new rights Poland saw 2 years of strikes and demonstrations. They were not random but organized actions lead by newly established movement Solidarity, which headed all the independent unions of workers.[3]

[blockquote cite=”” type=”left, center, right”]…the U.S. feared Western European dependence of the Western Europe on the Siberian Gas Pipeline as a source of gas…[/blockquote]

Martial law and end of crisis

Various protests continued during the following months, all in a one similar pattern –demonstrations took turns with calm and discussions.[4] These developments were of course perceived with significant fear in Moscow, which put pressure on the Polish government to quiet the situation. Thus on December 13th 1981 the highest communist representatives in the country proclaimed martial law.[5] This martial law was not lifted until July 22nd 1983 and during it the U.S. had very troublesome relations with the USSR, which influenced the Reagan administration´s decisions and opinions on the Siberian Gas Pipeline.[6]

 

U.S. views on energy security in Western Europe

Since the USSR was one of the richest countries in natural resources and the biggest producer of gas and oil in Europe, the U.S. feared Western European dependence of the Western Europe on the Siberian Gas Pipeline as a source of gas. In addition, American officials were persuaded that the Soviets perceived the pipeline as a major step toward reducing the U.S.´s ability to restrict East-West trade.[7]

The importance of the pipeline

Contrary to the public opinion and media presentation, the Siberian pipeline was not a major threat to the energy security of Western countries.[8] The CIA reported on this issue that if completed, it would supply less than 3% of Europe´s energy needs. It was also stated that it would not significantly reduce security by diversifying sources and reducing dependence on Persia Gulf countries. Gas from the Soviet Union would substitute only 10% of the overall supply coming from Middle East, which in case of any crisis would not cause problems. Moreover, there were limits to how much gas can the Siberian pipeline transport and thus there was no chance it could offset Arabian sources. Thus, the agency was persuaded that the construction of the pipeline would rather add to the problem of energy security than to solve it because even if slightly, the Soviet gas would add to the energy dependency of the Western Europe on the USSR.[9]

Solution and energy alternative

CIA´s proposed solution about what to substitute for the potential Soviet gas was to use Algerian and Nigeria LNG, which the U.S. was about to stop using, and which would cover about 50-75% of projected imports to Western Europe from the USSR. Also it counted with alternative from a combination of American and Australian coal, accompanied by Norwegian and British gas from the North Sea, and by enhancing the production of synthetic gas, which Europe was able to do.[10] An interesting suggest came from the American Secretary of Defense, who proposed to export Alaska´s oil to Japan, which would reduce Japanese demand on Persian Gulf´s markets and vis-à-vis strengthen the European position in dealing with Middle East suppliers. Another alternative was to increase Dutch production levels by exploring offshore reserves. Finally, there was an encouragement going to Germany to increase its capacity to generate nuclear power, which was fairly low in the 1980s.[11]

 

U.S. economic and military policies towards the Soviet Union

From the previous text it is clear that energy security was not a major threat to the Western Europe in relation to the proposed pipeline (despite what the U.S. thought), it is a necessity to explain why Washington was thus so opposed to the pipeline. The response lies in the economic and military worries of the U.S., with both of them going hand in hand.

Economic aspects of the pipeline

Central concern of the U.S. was not to contribute to the Soviet military buildup by bad economic policies. Payments for gas coming from Siberian deposits would give the Soviets money to spend. At the beginning of the 1980s military expenditures equaled 10-12% of the USSR´s budget. Because overall economic growth was slowing down, it was increasingly harder for Soviets to matchup with Western military spending especially with the U.S. The projected pipeline was dangerous for several reasons. Though, its revenues would not have significantly improved the Soviet economy, they would have increased hard currency reserves, which could have been used to offset their shortages caused by declining oil revenues. Naturally, these reserves could purchase foreign goods among them Western machinery and technology. Also, Western technology, which would have been used during the pipeline´s construction could be used for military development (this will be clarified later). Without the pipeline USSR would have to use other sources of revenues to keep up with military development and thus exacerbate its overall economic shape, which was in the interest of the U.S. and their allies. The CIA estimated that hard currency fallings could have reached $10 billion and as such, forcing reductions in certain imports would have been necessary.[12]

In addition, in 1981 Western Europe was responsible for 65% of the Soviets´ hard currency income.[13]

 

Military aspects of the pipeline

Of all the disagreements between the allies and the U.S., the issue involving military application of funds from the pipeline was the key. It was even more important than events in Poland. The projected economic growth plus import of technologies necessary to the construction of the pipeline worried the U.S. Exports from the West involved large-diameter pipe and advanced compressors, which the Soviets were not able to produce in similar quality and quantity. The U.S. predicted that these can be used in naval ship production, ground force weapons, aircraft engines, and especially in the development of advanced ICBMs.[14] Without these the U.S. predicted that Moscow´s leaders would be more willing to deal about arms controls.[15]

[blockquote cite=”” type=”left, center, right”]Without the pipeline USSR would have to use other sources of revenues to keep up with military development and thus exacerbate its overall economic shape, which was in the interest of the U.S. and their allies. [/blockquote]

British involvement in the Siberian pipeline

Britain had several particular concerns in the completion of the Siberian gas pipeline. Because it was to great degree energy independent, it had mainly economic stakes involved.

Economic involvement

During the pipeline dispute, Britain was in serious economical trouble. The unemployment rate was about 10%, the coal industry was in decline and many British companies had financial troubles. The pipeline brought the opportunity to improve financial stability. Rolls Royce was involved in the delivery of compressors for the project worth $300-600 million.[16] John Brown Engineering was involved in a $182 million contract for gas pipelines, Smith International signed a contract worth $21.7 million, which involved 500 workers, and Machinoimport Baker Oil Tools had a stake worth $25 million.[17] These numbers were serious for the British government and it did not want them to be threatened in any way.

 

Siberian Gas Pipeline

West European countries started to evaluate the Siberian gas pipeline project in 1970s and early 1980. When the U.S. became interested it was 1981. None of the countries involved were therefore even willing to consider any reversal of decisions made in previous years, and thus construction of the pipeline was in their eyes a “done deal”. [18]

Events leading to dispute

U.S. officials started seriously thinking about the pipeline in July 1981 while deciding about the future of East-West Trade Policy. The plan was that issues, that worried Americans, will be presented to the allies at the G7 summit in Ottawa, which was planned for the 20th July of the same year. The main focus should be put on exports of national security materials, oil and gas equipment and, in the U.S. case, also 100 Caterpillar pipe layers to the USSR. Washington´s plan was to increase bans on selling certain things to the Soviet Union especially products deemed necessary for the military (shipbuilding and heavy equipment). For Great Britain this was a serious problem since its companies´ deals with Soviets would, if the country accepted export restrictions, been scratched, and no business would be carried on. From America´s previous experiences with unsuccessful efforts to tightening restrictions on the sale of metallurgical technology, which the U.S. had tried to negotiate among COCOM[19] members, the White House was now planning a different strategy. Its key point was to ease limits on certain less important articles (e.g. super alloys) but tighten limits on technology, and approached the allies with this at the G7 meeting in Ottawa.[20]

After Ottawa summit in 1981

As one can predict, nothing particular was decided in Ottawa. The official declaration from the summit contained only one proposition about the pipeline issues. Point 37 stated that they would have further consult actions about the trade control system with the Soviet Union.[21]

In the week following the summit, the Americans pushed to impose sanctions on the Soviet Union in aim to impede the Siberian pipeline. Their focus was to not let the Soviets obtain technology that could be used for the military means. However, the U.S. broadened their demands to include industrial production as well. There were several parts of turbines that were necessary for the pipeline, which were not produced by anybody else except the U.S. companies. This was a way to delay the construction since European competitors needed about 18-28 months to develop the same.

Washington´s officials feared that transfer of technology could result in helping the Soviets develop new kinds of weapons, such as with the technology the USSR had used in MIRV[22] development in the past. Such s possibility was not in American interest at all and, in fact rationally speaking, in Western European either. Still, the British, French and West Germans were in no way prepared or willing to cooperate with Washington on possible trade restrictions. Even several American officials worried about the potential impact on the U.S. involved companies, especially Caterpillar, which was about to deliver pipe layers, rotors, shafts, etc. However, these economic implications were outweighed by national security factors as well as the company´s ability to sell these products in the South American market.[23]

Polish martial law and first wave of sanctions

When the Polish government proclaimed martial law, the U.S. wanted to enact direct sanctions on the USSR in coordination with allies, because Washington was afraid that the Soviets would directly intervene and suppress the resistance, and second, if the Soviets had succeeded, it would destroy all hopes for broader social change in Eastern bloc.[24] This in fact showed false because American embassy in Moscow told Washington that they did not observed any indications that the Soviet are preparing an invasion to Poland.[25] Still, there was heated communication between the U.S. and U.K. about how to respond to the situation. Both countries gave mutual assurances to not go along and show the Soviets that they still remain staunchly united.[26] Nonetheless, the U.S. was ready to impose sanctions on Poland and the USSR if they did not peacefully solve the crisis immediately. As such, after warnings from President Reagan to both the Polish leaders Jaruzelski and the Soviet general secretary Brezhnev, Americans decided to proceed with sanctions.[27] On December 29th 1981 Ronald Reagan publicly announced measures for punishing the Soviets for what was going on in Poland. Among these he banned export of electronic equipment, computers and high-technology material to the USSR, and licenses for pipe layers export was suspended.[28]

In addition, the U.S. approved other measures in relation to Poland (e.g. credit limit, fishing industry limits, suspension of trade negotiations etc.).[29]

British response

Reaction to the sanctions varied but were mostly negative. For Britain the issue related to jobs. Since export bans contained also a ban on shafts, which were needed by Rolls-Royce for its production of turbines and which was the product of the U.S. Cooper Technology company, this restriction was against its economic interest.[30] Also, one study showed that as much as 3000 jobs directly linked to the pipeline project would have waned and as much as 1600 at John Brown Engineering´s plant in Scotland – region with high long-term unemployment.[31]

British officials protested against the extra territorial reach of the sanctions, which damaged Europe not the U.S. They were afraid to follow additional restrictions, which they felt would be even more damaging for the economy. Also, Britain was afraid about the Western banks involvement and possible financial problems, which would have implications broader than anyone could imagine.[32] Thatcher expressed her personal opinion directly to Reagan. She was very concerned, as were other British officials, that American policies could be a serious threat to the unity of the Western Alliance. In the worst case, she said, Moscow could get a first level propaganda opportunity to show the division between the capitalist countries. She her with her own set of proposals, which British officials were willing to accept. While they were similar in relation to Poland, what she suggested for the USSR were different since they did not include any restrictions on exports of technology relating to the pipeline. Thatcher stressed that the U.K. and other European countries were in no way prepared to give up their existing obligations towards the pipeline. In other words the companies involved are going ahead with all the contracts.[33]

Reagan tried to explain his decision further. In March 1982 he wrote to the British that the USSR, which was currently economically weak, was suffering a shortage of hard currency, and thus to undermine the country even more, Western countries should not support it with foreign exchange. Thatcher reacted in concordant manner but without any mention of changing her opinion.[34]

Second wave of sanctions

The U.S. in the first half of the 1982 evaluated the impact of its sanctions. It also planned to speak with the allies during the June 1982 Versailles G7 meeting about imposing further measures. When the reports on the influence of sanctions came out the politicians saw that they were inefficient. President Reagan compared them to a leaky sieve. He was sure that they had to be strengthened no matter what the Europeans thought and so he approached the Versailles summit ready to agree that the Soviet Union was in the weakest period of its development and that no matter in what recession the states are they should not continue with the quiet diplomacy and rather approve restrictions to strike the Soviets. As predicted, the Europeans stayed firmly opposed.[35]

The summer 1982 brought little change in Poland. Thus, the decision to impose second wave of sanctions, or rather to toughen up these already existing, was from aforementioned perspective hardly surprising. The tightened sanctions were meant to prevent subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad from selling products to the USSR, and include equipment produced abroad under the license of U.S. companies.[36] Unlike the previous sanctions, however, these were not approved by everyone in Congress. The media reported an “Explosive Meeting on June 24”, where opposing group of officials expressed their strong disagreement with Reagan. They were mostly concerned about the negative voices from Europe and blamed the president for driving a wedge between the U.S. and its allies.[37]

British reaction

If British officials had been relatively calm in their views about the first unilateral American steps, after the announcement of the second wave of sanction they were furious. Their main worry was the economy. John Brown Engineering was in financial trouble even after the first wave, but because of the second it was denied the necessary components it needed for its production order that was due to be shipped to the USSR in few weeks. Thus the company became the focus of the squabble.[38]

[blockquote cite=”” type=”left, center, right”]The tightened sanctions were meant to prevent subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad from selling products to the USSR, and include equipment produced abroad under the license of U.S. companies.[/blockquote]

The British considered the measures taken by Reagan´s administration wrong in principle, since they had direct impact on several British companies. These were even threatened by closure.[39] The British decided to not follow the embargo and proceed with all contracts. This was reiterated by British officials including Thatcher. She said that Britain could take actions to keep its companies from being threatened by these sanctions, but her criticism went even further. She was enraged by the fact that the U.S. imposed sanctions (before the first and second wave) after all the contracts had been signed. Thatcher publicly expressed her disappointment by stating that she was “deeply wounded by a friend”.[40] Likewise, other countries did the same, and Italian, French and German companies went ahead with their obligations.[41]

Lifting of the sanctions and restoration of relations

European leaders were keen to lift sanctions and in an unusual expression of unity they approached the U.S. with their requirements. They also questioned the logic behind Reagan´s decision to resume grain sales to the USSR in the autumn 1982, while still maintaining sanctions on the pipeline equipment.[42] The American reasoning was that grain sales could suck out the Soviets´ credit reserves, while importing Soviet gas would do the opposite appeared to be a weak argument, since most of the European states considered it only rhetoric justifying double standards. In particular, Europeans made the claim that despite no change in Poland or Afghanistan, the U.S. was suddenly changing its approach towards the Soviet Union. Several of them considered the sanctions as pure electoral propaganda.[43]

Reagan used every opportunity to justify his decisions. He was encouraged by various reports about Moscow´s financial problems and he did not want to lift restrictions to give the Soviets hope that very soon they could earn a hefty amount of hard currency. Washington saw the credit issue as an opportunity to push USSR into a different direction in its policy.[44]

However, the President was attacked from all sides. Even a Republican committee passed a bill to lift restrictions on the U.S. companies supplying material for the pipeline.[45] The EEC told Americans that the sanctions were against international law.[46] The French announced that instead of using U.S. technology, they would use their own.[47] Even outside of Europe, Japan defied the by sanctions and shipped 10 million worth of valves to the Soviet Union.[48] The Dispute reached its worst phase at the end of September, when U.S. Secretary of State Schulz said to his European counterparts that the split was so deep that there was no point even discussing any compromises.[49]

The final solution of the dispute came from White House and its internal division. Anti-communist hardliners started to lose influence over the sanctions and more moderate opinion emerged.[50] Talks about finding agreement between various branches of government were underway, and the U.S. was slowly moving from its uncompromising position.[51] On November 13th 1982, Reagan finally announced his decision that all previously imposed restrictions would be lifted.[52] Simultaneously, the U.S. and West European countries agreed on broader steps concerning the East-West trade issues. Important fact was that countries committed to no new deals relating to the pipeline while study on energy alternatives will be carried on.[53]

Britain reacted promptly. Thatcher expressed her pleasure about Reagan´s decision and gave him her mutual assurances of British cooperation on measures established as a part of the wider agreement.[54]

 

Conclusion

Central question of this work was to find out if the publicly perceived smooth relationship between Reagan and Thatcher ever suffered some wounds. The Siberian gas pipeline dispute, which was chosen as a key study, shows that both world leaders were deeply divided over the issue. The British side was in no way willing to threaten its already shake economy by preventing its companies from acting on trade opportunities abroad, even if it was on the territory of its main ideological opponent.

At the same time, President Reagan and his American side wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining advanced technology, even with the risk of hurting Europe-American relations, including Anglo-British ones. Margaret Thatcher´s statement about being deeply wounded by a friend demonstrates how serious the squabble was. The Siberian gas pipeline dispute was significant from the point of view that it was the open manifestation of disagreement over the strategy between allies during the Cold War. It was reported in various newspapers and TV channels, and thus Soviets as Thatcher once said, had a propaganda opportunity to show the division between Western Europe and the U.S.

 

Bibliography and Notes

Primary Sources

Declassified documents

William J. Casey. CIA memorandum on Siberian pipeline to the U.S. president and others. July 8, 1981. MOS-1225AW/2, National Archives

Declaration of the Ottawa Summit: 20-1 July 1981

Department of State Briefing Paper. Oil and Gas Controls – Equipment for the piperine. January 7 1982. National Archives

Memorandum for the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs. Siberian Pipeline. July 8 1981, MO3-1278AH, National Archives

NAC Contingency response. The National Security Archives at George Washington University.

National Security Council Meeting. East-West Trade controls. July 6 1981. 11:09 a.m. – 12.22 p.m.. The Cabinet Room, M1277#1. National Archives

National Intelligence Council memorandum, The Soviet Bloc Financial Problem as a Source of

Western Influence (u), April 1982, National Archives

National Intelligence Estimate. The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interest. July 31 1982. NIE 11/4-82, National Archives

National Security Council Meeting. East-West Trade controls. July 6 1981. 11:09 a.m. – 12.22 p.m.. The Cabinet Room, M1277#1. National Archives

National Security Council Meeting. East-West trade control. October 16 1981. 2:00 – 3:00 p.m.. The Cabinet Room. M03-1283#23. National Archives

National Security Council meeting, July 91981, M03-1278AH24, National Archives

Special National Intelligence Estimate. The Soviet Cag Pipeline in Perspective. Septermber 21 1982. SNIE 3-11/2-82. National Archives

The White House. National Security decision. Directive number 41. Sanctions on oil and gas equipment exports to Soviet Union. June 20 1982. National Archives

The White House, National Security decision, Directive number 66, East-West Economic Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions, November 29, 1982, National Archives

 

Letters

Haig, Alexander, Alexander Haig telegram to Ronald Reagan. London. England. January 29 1982.

Reagan, Ronald, Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher, Washington, Washington DC, December 19, 1981

Reagan, Ronald, Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher, Washington, Washington DC, December 24, 1981

Secratary of state to American embasy in Moscow. Priority Info On Soviet Response. The National Security Archives at George Washington University.

Thatcher, Margaret, Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, London, England, December 22, 1981

Thatcher, Margaret, Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, London, England, January 29, 1982

Thatcher, Margaret, Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, London, England, June 25 1982

Thatcher, Margaret, Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, London, England, November 12 1982

 

Interviews, Statements

Margaret Thatcher, interview by James Cox, BBC, September 1 1982 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104815

Reagan, Ronald, Radio Address to the Nation on Agriculture and Grain Exports, (1982), October 15 1982, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/101582a.htm

Ronald, Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, (1982), November 13, 1982, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/111382a.htm

Reagan, Ronald, “Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland” (1981), December 29, 1981, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/122981m.htm

 

Newspapers

New York Times

Henry Kamm, “Polish Party Urges Special Action: Polish Party Calls for Action to…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Nov 29, 1981. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121645504/141AF9113114A672826/1?accountid=27881

John Darnton. “Arrests reported: Premier Declares ‘State of War’ to Insure ‘Law and…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Dec 13, 1981. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121612146/141AF92BBED1E272364/1?accountid=27881

John Darnton. “Polish Union Warns Of A General Strike In Warsaw Industry: Workers…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Nov 26, 1980. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121020491/141AF8F6B8964525134/1?accountid=27881

John Vinocur. “Europe Reacts Mildly to Grain Decision”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Oct 19. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121852552/141AFC6855E2F230C66/1?accountid=27881

Leslie H. Gelb. “Reagan Is Seeking Ways To Moderate Poland Sanctions: Looking For An…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Jul 9. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/122004488/141AFB8180B66F5385B/1?accountid=27881

Paul Lewisparis. “A Soviet Project Tempts Europe: The gas pipeline means lots of jobs…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). May 30. 1982; ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121996162/141AFB1BD7F4319194C/1?accountid=27881

“Around the World: Striking Polish Workers Said to Accept Pay Accord”, New York Times (1923-Current file). Jul 20, 1980; Pro Quest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121319616/141AF89900E2DC32371/1?accountid=27881

“Depending on Soviet Gas”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Dec 3, 1980. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121354079/141AF952CFB4B561979/1?accountid=27881

“More Join In Strike In Polish Port City; 50,000 Are Affected: Gierek Returns From Soviet Walkouts In…”,New York Times (1923-Current file). Aug 16, 1980. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/121355199/141AF8BC90271384748/1?accountid=27881

“Polish Parliament To Sit Next Week: Martial Law To Be On Agenda…”. New York Times (1923-Current file). Jul 12, 1983. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/122132237/141AF94089562A1E7AE/1?accountid=27881

 

The Guardian and Observer

Alex Brummer. Niki Knewstub. “Reagan eases pipeline reprisal against Britain and France”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Sep 2. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186360330/141AFBCEA243C4AA178/1?accountid=27881

Brian Eads. “Soft sell for the iron lady”. The Observer (1901- 2003). Sep 19. 1982; ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/476786792/141AFCD5AB55673DCF/1?accountid=27881

Harold, Jackson. “Republicans rebel on pipeline embargo”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Aug 12. 1982; Pro Quest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186291371/141AFCB03F97626952E/2?accountid=27881

Harold Jackson. “White House divided about gas pipeline row”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Oct 18. 1982.

ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186421693/141AFCFEACE23C0BA05/1?accountid=27881

John Palmer. “Gas pipeline compromise ‘closer’ after talks in US”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Oct 26. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186429003/141AFD08C3642E0DF1/1?accountid=27881

Jane. Rosen. “Pipeline dispute positions harden”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Sep 29. 1982; ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186294278/141AFCEB4D55DF78C9E/1?accountid=27881

Paul Webster. “Paris ditches US motors as response to pipeline embargo”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Aug 27. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186366409/141AFCC39C17CA7422F/1?accountid=27881

“Thatcher lauds force“. The Guardian (1959-2003). Jul 8 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186368085/141AFC3397D416F6C43/1?accountid=27881

“EEC hits back at ban on pipeline”. The Guardian (1959-2003). Aug 13. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpguardianobserver/docview/186388825/141AFCBD1397D23D6F6/1?accountid=27881

 

Wall Street Journal

Robert L. Muller, David Brand. “Britain Orders 4 Firms to Defy U.S. Pipeline Ban: U.K. Move Affects…”. Wall Street Journal (1923 – Current file). Aug 3. 1982. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. http://0-search.proquest.com.library.lemoyne.edu/hnpwallstreetjournal/docview/134712630/141AF9C7EEA3D5D75C4/1?accountid=27881

 

Audio Books and Cassettes

Margaret Thatcher, Downing Street Years, (HarperAudio: London, 1993), Audio Cassette.

 

Secondary Sources

Jason Saltoun-Ebin. The Reagan Files: The Untold Story of Reagan’s Top-Secret Efforts to Win the Cold War. Independent Publishing Platform (September 15, 2010). 504

 

NOTES

[1] “Around the World: Striking Polish Workers Said to Accept Pay Accord …, .” New York Times , July 20, 1980.

[2] “More Join In Strike In Polish Port City; 50,000 Are Affected: Gierek Returns From SOVIET Walkouts in.”, New York Times  August 16, 1980.

[3] Darnton, John. “Polish Union Warns Of A General Strike In Warsaw Industry: Workers… .” New York Times , November 26, 1980.

[4] Kamm, Henry. “Polish Party Urges Special Action: Polish Party Calls for Action to ….” New York Times , November 29, 1981.

[5] Darnton, John. “Arrests Reported: Premier Declares ‘State of War’ to Insure ‘Law and ….” New York Times , December 13, 1981.

[6] “Polish Parliament To Sit Next Week: Martial Law to Be on Agenda — ….” New York Times , Julyr 12, 1983.

[7] National Intelligence Estimate. The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interest. July 31 1982. NIE 11/4-82, National Archives

 

[8] “Depending on Soviet Gas.” New York Times , December 3, 1980.

[9] William J. Casey. CIA memorandum on Siberian pipeline to the U.S. president and others. July 8, 1981. MOS-1225AW/2, National Archives

[10] William J. Casey. CIA memorandum on Siberian pipeline to the U.S. president and others. July 8, 1981. MOS-1225AW/2, National Archives

[11] Memorandum for the assistant to the president for National Security Affairs. Siberian Pipeline. July 8 1981, MO3-1278AH, National Archives

[12] William J. Casey. CIA memorandum on Siberian pipeline to the U.S. president and others. July 8, 1981. MOS-1225AW/2, National Archives

[13] National Intelligence Estimate. The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interest. July 31 1982. NIE 11/4-82, National Archives

[14] ICBM – Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

[15] William J. Casey. CIA memorandum on Siberian pipeline to the U.S. president and others. July 8, 1981. MOS-1225AW/2, National Archives

[16] National Security Council meeting, July 9th 1981, M03-1278AH24, National Archives

[17] Muller, Robert, and David Brand. “Britain Orders 4 Firms to Defy U.S. Pipeline Ban: U.K. Move Affects ….” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1982.

[18] Special National Intelligence Estimate. The Soviet Cag Pipeline in Perspective. Septermber 21 1982. SNIE 3-11/2-82. National Archives

[19]  Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

[20] National Security Council Meeting. East-West Trade controls. July 6 1981. 11:09 a.m. – 12.22 p.m.. The Cabinet Room, M1277#1. National Archives

[21] Declaration of the Ottawa Summit: 20-1 July 1981

[22] Multiply Independently targetable reentry vehicle

[23] National Security Council Meeting. East-West trade kontrol. October 16 1981. 2:00 – 3:00 p.m.. The Cabinet Room. M03-1283#23. National Archives

[24] Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher, December 19, 1981

[25] Secratary of state to American embasy in Moscow. Priority Info On Soviet Response. The National Security Archives at George Washington University.

[26] Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, December 22, 1981

[27] Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher, December 24, 1981

[28] Reagan, Ronald, “Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Concerning Its Involvement in Poland”, December 21 1981, (1981)

[29] NAC Contingency response, The National Security Archives at George Washington University.

[30] Department of State Briefing Paper, Oil and Gas Controls – Equipment for the piperine, National Archives

[31]Lewisparis, Paul. “A Soviet Project Tempts Europe: The gas pipeline means lots of jobs, …,.” New York Times, May 30, 1982.

[32] Alexander Haig to Ronald Reagan, January 29, 1982

[33] Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, January 29, 1982

[34] Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993)

[35]  Jason Saltoun-Ebin, The Reagan Files: The Untold Story of Reagan’s Top-Secret Efforts to Win the Cold War (Based on Recently Declassified Letters and National Security Council Meeting Minutes), p. 164-165

[36] The White House. National Security decision. Directive number 41. Sanctions on oil and gas equipment exports to Soviet Union. June 20 1982. National Archives

[37] Gelb, Leslie. “Reagan is Seeking Ways to Moderate Poland Sanctions: Looking for an ….” New York Times, July 9, 1982.

[38]Brummer, Alex, and Nikki Knewstub. “Reagan eases pipeline reprisal against Britain and France .” The Guardian, September 2, 1982.

[39] Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, June 25 1982

[40] Margaret Thatcher, interview by James Cox, BBC, September 1 1982

[41] “Thatcher lauds force.” The Guardian, July 8, 1982.

[42] Reagan, Ronald, Radio Address to the Nation on Agriculture and Grain Exports, (1982), October 15 1982

[43] Vinocur, John. “Europe Reacts Mildly to Grain Decision .”New York Times, October 19, 1982.

[44] National Intelligence Council memorandum, The Soviet Bloc Financial Problem as a Source of

Western Influence (u), April 1982, National Archives

[45] Jackson, Harold. “Republicans rebel on pipeline embargo .”The Guardian, August 12, 1982.

[46] “EEC hits back at ban on pipeline.” The Guardian, August 13, 1982.

[47] Webster, Paul. “Paris ditches US motors as response to pipeline embargo.” The Guardian, August 27, 1982.

[48] “Soft sell for the iron lady Eads.” The Observer, September 19, 1982.

[49] Rosen, Jane. “Pipeline dispute positions harden.” The Guardian, September 29, 1982.

[50] Jackson, Harold. “White House divided about gas pipeline row.” The Guardian, October 18, 1982.

[51] Palmer, John. “Gas pipeline compromise ‘closer’ after talks in US .” The Guardian, October 26, 1982.

[52] Ronald, Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions, (1982), November 13, 1982

[53] The White House, National Security decision, Directive number 66, East-West Economic Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions, November 29th 1982, National Archives

[54] Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, November 12 1982