Autor: Petr Neugebauer ( Universität Zürich)

Introduction

Do we need nationalism in our time and why is it so persistent? If it is just an “imagined community” as Anderson famously coined it in 1983, than why do we not use a different and less exclusionist concept? A very profound argument against throwing nationalism in a dustbin of history is, that there are “no compelling alternatives on offer” (Ozkirimli 2003, 343). Thus we have to focus on the role and functions of nationalism in today’s world, which will provide us with possibilities to change nationalism and make it less chauvinistic and better fitting for globalizing societies.

To answer this question I will scrutinize findings of prominent scholars of nationalism, with a focus on functions of nationalism and put them in context. The first group of arguments is based on the modernist theory, which stresses structural changes caused by industrialization leading to growth of mobility, removal of feudal privileges, creation of a mass culture with preferably a single language reproduced by state controlled education and other state institutions, as also printing media. Therefore it could be argued that nationalism enabled homogenization and democratization of societies, which led to a mass education and army formed from citizens and consequently also mass political participation. This position is broadened by later works of scholars, who stress the role of the state in spread and reproduction of nationalism. Therefore I will focus on nationalism as a state ideology, which creates an emotional bond of citizens to their states, thence fostering citizens’ loyalty and legitimacy of states’ claims on citizens to pay taxes or even to go to a war to “defend our Motherland”.

…nationalism enabled homogenization and democratization of societies, which led to a mass education and army formed from citizens and consequently also mass political participation…

A development of nationalism brought two conceptions of nationalism. The first was formed by elites as a state religion, which would be called state-patriotism. State patriotism and loyalty to abstract institutions was attractive for intellectuals and higher classes, but missed simplicity and emotions, which were needed for mobilization of broad and uneducated masses. Therefore an ethnonationalist concept of a nation as a broader family was established. According to it we are connected to our nation by our blood, Motherland, culture, history and future. This enabled conservative and authoritative forces to adopt nationalism. The primordialist concept (nation is historically determined given and somehow eternal, static and beyond history) is widespread among population until nowadays, although refused by academic community. How nationalism was able to become an important part of our identity will be shortly sketched using also ethno-symbolist theory. At the end I will discuss political parties labelled as nationalist in Europe.

I will argue that the state and also psychological characteristics of its citizens plays a vital role in reproduction of national identity. Nationalism in disenchantment world of modern life (as Weber 1964 coined it) complements traditionalistic world view. I will argue that foremost conservative people who do not like change and need clear boundaries in their world adopt nationalist positions, which are based on specifically constructed version of history contrasting with today globalised world with blurred lines illustrated by development of the European Union (EU).

Is nationalism good or bad?

Nationalism has a negative connotation in popular usage. As Billig notes “Our nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, surplus, and alien; it is presented as patriotism, which is good and beneficial.” (Billig 1995). This separation is close to a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism introduced by Kohn in 1944, which was later identified as rather normative concept distinguishing between good civic nationalism and bad ethnic nationalism (e.g. Brubaker 1999). As Hechter (2000, 15) summarizes it, classifications of nationalism “distinguish the liberal, cultural inclusive (Sleeping Beauty) nationalism characteristic of Western Europe from the illiberal, culturally exclusive (Frankenstein’s monster) nationalism more often found elsewhere.” But instead of distinguishing between nationalisms according to these two categories, it is much more helpful to identify tendencies inside those nationalisms as they usually combines civic and ethnic conceptions in a different proportions.

Distinction of civic and ethnic tendencies in nations is a complicated issue as shows Connor’s discussion of terminology (2004). Although I find his term ethnonationalism quite helpful, I am in doubt about the concept of “civic nationalism” for different reasons than him. I do not share his opinion that Americans, Brits or Indians (probably also the Swiss) are not a nation, because they are multi-ethnic. Using concepts of Tönnies’ dichotomy, I think that a nation can be a Gesellschaft (society based on rational social contract) and does not have to be Gemeinschaft (based on emotional (fictive) kinship). Term “civic nationalism” could therefore represent civic loyalty to a Gesellschaft and not loyalty to a dominant ethnic Gemeinschaft, for example in traditionally immigrant and multi-ethnic countries such as USA, Canada or Australia. But it is more problematic for European countries, which were emigrant countries during the 19th century and a first half of the 20th century. During that time they also homogenised different ethnic groups into a dominant “national” ethnic group (e.g. from Occitanians and Savoyans into Frenchmen). They are becoming immigrant-countries since the end of the Second World War and also acknowledging this change, followed by much of a pain and a success of xenophobic political parties. In these countries a nation is perceived in a traditionalistic way – consisting of a single dominant ethnic group. Distinction between tradition and traditionalism is based on (Eriksen 2002, 100): “Nationalism, which is frequently a traditionalistic ideology, may glorify and recodify an ostensibly ancient tradition shared by the ancestors of the members of the nation, but it does not thereby re-create that tradition”. To reflect multi-ethnic reality, states cannot be longer dominated by ethnodominant conception and has to become ethnically neutral or rather multi-ethnic, they should also lower entrance-criteria into the nation membership, although keeping ideal ethnical core as Kaufamn (2000) suggests it.

A hurdle for realization of these aims is, that so called “nationalist” parties are ethnonationalist and thereby lead to a misleading (ethnonationalist) use and understanding of the concept of a nation among the general public and also political elites. That makes multi-ethnic reframing quite difficult. Notwithstanding that “nationalists” act in the name of a “nation”, their basic loyalty is not linked to multi-ethnic or dominant-ethnic nation, but only to a particular version of that nation, to an ideological construct of supposed mono-ethnic past (to paraphrase Hobsbawm 1990). Therefore to distinguish clearly from this common understanding of a “nation”, I will rather use term state-patriotism for forms of loyalty to nation-state institutions. Although also many “patriotic” groups, a foremost example in this regard is the US, are rather ethnonationalist, I found term patriotism to be helpful, foremost in European context, where it helps to distinguish between ethno-centric and state-centric concepts of nationalism.

Following Ozkirimli (2003, 341) example and making my normative assumptions clear from the start, I have to declare, that I am not an anti-nationalist as he is, but I think that there has to be a strong critique of ethnonationalism. Crucial role of scholars and politicians is to convince a broad public about the need for change of conception of a nation from dominant mono-ethnic to culturally neutral multi-ethnic states.

What is nationalism and why is it important?

After making clear my normative stance on nationalism, I would like to present my understanding of the term. I think a nation is a politicized ethnic group, which strives to create a state. At the same time it can be also a voluntary union of more ethnic groups which are bound by supra-ethnic nationalism striving for a state. Nationalism is therefore an ideology, which stances that national boundaries (both ethnic and multi-ethnic) should be the same as political boundaries of a state (as Gellner wrote). I base my understanding of ethnic groups on Eriksen (2002), who sees them as social constructs (identity), without necessarily objective cultural features and boundaries, which are rather based on contact and contrast between “Us” and “Others” and characterized by metaphoric or fictive kinship.

Why is nationalism important? Eriksen (2002, 99 emphasis mine own) summarized that anthropological “[r]esearch on ethnic identity formation and boundary maintenance has indicated that ethnic identities tend to attain their greatest importance in situations of flux, change, resource competition and threats against boundaries. It is not surprising, therefore, that political movements based on cultural identity are strong in societies undergoing modernisation, although this does not account for the fact that these movements become nationalist movements.” Although actual nation-building process in Macedonia (FYROM) with all the kitsch neo-historical statues and buildings of the Skopje 2014 project (see Balkaninsight.com 2013) may seem to us to be obscure form of (ethno)nationalism, but success of populist (ethno)nationalist parties in the EU stresses the importance of nationalism in today “Western” World.

…political movements based on cultural identity are strong in societies undergoing modernisation…

Modernism: Homogenization and democratization

If we want to understand, why nationalism is still alive today, we have to look into its history. According to Gellner nationalism has its origins in times of a change of society from agrarian into industrial. Industrialisation means rationalization and growth-ideology replacing particularism of agrarian societies. Technological development led to creation of industries, which needed mobility of masses of workers, who have to be freed through “democratization” from feudal subordination to nobility. Gellner (2006) accentuates importance of communication enabled by mass culture and education. Agrarian communication barriers between high-culture of nobility and clergy (e.g. use of Latin) and low-culture of myriads of local communities (different dialects of vernacular languages) has to be erased by creating of a new mass culture, enabling context free communication. A new mass culture is spread through a free and state sponsored education, which tends to be monolingual and eradicates local dialects and foster cultural homogenisation. Anderson (1991) stresses the importance of printed media, which lead to growing role of vernacular languages and their codification, leading again to homogenisation. Weakening of tribe and local identities and their distinct cultures and languages was enabled by growth of mobility caused by more effective transportation technology. This homogenisation and democratisation led to more efficient usage of societal resources, because it “broke down the various localisms of region, dialect, custom, and clan, and helped to create large and powerful nation-states, with centralised markets and systems of administration, taxation, and education.” (Smith 1998, 1).

Nationalism as patriotism and state religion

1804 Code Civil

Homogenisation and democratisation fostered centralisation, further strengthening the former. Hechter (2000) connects growth of nationalism with a change from state indirect ruler typical for the mediaeval period to a modern centralised direct rule. Nationalism was an ideology which opposed particular interests of periphery and strengthened the centre. This power shift was made possible by development of communication and transportation technology which enabled the centre to intervene into local affairs. Also development of military and international trade made centre stronger, because it was too costly for local communities. Direct rule needs a cultural homogenisation, which constitutes a state-building nationalism. Leader of this change was revolutionary and foremost Napoleonic France, which was thanks to centralisation able to innovate its taxation, justice, public works and policing. Police penetrated local communities and army became strongly ruled by state. Centralised markets with less barriers became more effective and stimulated economic growth, which helped to finance modernisation of the army. This led to unparalleled geopolitical success and imposition of direct rule on conquered states or states endangered by Napoleon’s expansion.

The same rationalization and elimination of medieval structures also considerably weakened traditional sources of loyalty to the state, which was even more needed at the time when the military was formed by recruited citizens (proportion of mercenaries was decreasing) while the state needed more effective tax-collection for its armies and bureaucrats. As writes Hobsbawm (1990, 84): “Such traditional guarantors of loyalty as dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule, or religious cohesion, were severely weakened. Last, but not least, all these traditional legitimations of state authority were, since 1789, under permanent challenge.” Thus the states needed a new form of civic legitimacy, which was by Rousseau called “civic religion”. But this kind of civic-patriotism was quite different from later ethnonationalism: “The original, revolutionary-popular, idea of patriotism was state-based rather than nationalist, since it related to the sovereign people itself, i.e. to the state exercising power in its name. Ethnicity or other elements of historical continuity were irrelevant to ‘the nation’ in this sense, and language relevant only or chiefly on pragmatic grounds. ‘Patriots’, in the original sense of the word, were the opposite of those who believed in ‘my country, right or wrong’” (Hobsbawm 1990, 87). Hobsbawm gives (Ibid.) a nice example of volunteers of National Guards, who in 1789 “took an oath of loyalty to Nation, Law and King, and declared that henceforth they were no longer Dauphinois, Provencaux or Languedociens, but only Frenchmen”, which was even more convincing for regions of Alsace, Lorraine and Franche Comte, which transformed “the inhabitants of provinces annexed by France a bare century ago into genuine Frenchmen.”

A lithograph by F.Sorrieu, Universal, Democratic and Social Republic: the Pact, subtitled: People, Forge a Holy Alliance and Hold Hands, 1848, Carnavalet museum, Paris.

F. Sourrieu: Universal, Democratic and Social Republic: the Pact, People, Forge a Holy Alliance and Hold Hands, 1848

Further democratisation of politics during 19th century, which gradually included poorer, lower, and broader layers of society and culminated in last third of the century expanded suffrage to all men, not yet women though. This led to a need of very broad legitimacy. At the same time the state was becoming even more dependent on its citizens voluntary or compulsory participation in modern warfare and on working class for its industries. Therefore monarchies of Europe used nationalism as a loyalty fostering ideology.

The elites created traditions and symbols such as flags and anthems, which foster loyalty to a state. Free public education and compulsory military service promoted language and traditions of “motherland” (Hechter, 2000). As Ohnmacht (2009) summarizes Gellner, fundamental task of a universal system of mass public education based on a standardised curriculum is to foster loyalty to the nation of its citizens and it uses especially subjects like literature, geography and history: “Not surprisingly, this ‘national curriculum’ was overfilled with messages of French grandeur and national unity; a subliminal message which embedded within the French citizen a sense of social belonging, a common history, and a shared identity.” (Ibid.). The process of cultural homogenisation and spread of nationalism Hechter (1977) termed as internal colonisation happened in supposedly “civic” nations such as France and Great Britain, but during time when it was not perceived as human-rights endangering (e.g. ban of usage of “bad” Welsh or Occitan languages instead of “proper” English or French).

The development which followed democratization, which led to populism very convincingly describes Hobsbawm (1990, 92): “While governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate ideological engineering, it would be a mistake to see these exercises as pure manipulation from above. They were, indeed, most successful when they could build on present unofficial nationalist sentiments, whether of demotic xenophobia or chauvinism … or, more likely, in nationalism among the middle and lower middle classes. To the extent that such sentiments were not created but only borrowed and fostered by governments, those who did so became a kind of sorcerer’s apprentice. At best they could not entirely control the forces they had released; at worst they became their prisoners.”  Next chapter will describe popular nationalism, which developed in last third of “the long 19th century” and escalated in the two World Wars.

Popular ethnonationalism of kinship

Industrialisation led to erosion of former identities. People used to live in closed small communities with family kinships. In time of industrialisation mass mobility was put into place, which led to rise of individualism and urbanisation. Individual became just one of many in anonymous masses of urbanized cities that frustrated their feeling of dignity and authenticity. As Eriksen (2002, 104) writes: “nationalism offers security and perceived stability at a time when life-worlds are fragmented and people are being uprooted. An important aim of nationalist ideology is thus to re-create a sentiment of wholeness and continuity with the past: to transcend that alienation or rupture between individual and society that modernity has brought about.”

workers

Problem of the state-patriotism is, that it creates symbols of institutions such a constitution, or a democratic state – which are abstract, rational and complicated concepts not easily understandable and too foreign for “common people”. Therefore nationalism had to become framed in terms, which were less abstract and understandable by less educated people and also much more emotional: “In general, nationalism, like other ethnic ideologies, appropriates symbols and meanings from cultural contexts which are important in people’s everyday experience” (Erisken 2002, 107). As Eriksen further argues, for this reason nationalism became a kind of metaphoric kinship, a nation is like a family – terms such motherland, father of a nation, brothers and sisters made it understandable, emotional and very powerful in democratised mass politics and bound its members into some notion of family obligations. Power of this parable is based on simple fact, that “Kinship and kin organisation are basic features of social organisation in most societies”. Eriksen (Ibid.) further continues “One may perhaps go so far as to say that urbanisation and individualism create a social and cultural vacuum in human lives in so far as kinship loses much of its importance. … It is an abstract version of something concrete [family] which every individual has strong emotions about and nationalism tries to transfer this emotional power to the state level. In this way, nationalism appears as a metaphoric kinship ideology tailored to fit large-scale modern society — it is the ideology of the nation-state.”

…Problem of the state-patriotism is, that it creates symbols of institutions such a constitution, or a democratic state – which are abstract, rational and complicated concepts not easily understandable and too foreign for “common people”…

Nationalism creates this feeling of kinship, acquaintances and “Us” identity, because it stresses common history, identity (authenticity) and also common future of nationals. Smith (1996) identifies instruments of collective memory, which nationalist use to foster loyalty and a feeling of kinship of nationals and to create an emotional attachment to the nation. First is a drive for regeneration based on memory of a golden age, which is the ideal against which is measured the present and extends self-imagination of individuals. Second is sense of collective mission and national destiny, which fulfils need for a distinctive task and future task (give raison d’etre to a community). Third is sense of national authenticity and folk-culture, which defines boundaries and says what is or is not mine, what is or is not distinctive, representative, or original. All three elements of nations (how Smith calls them) presuppose the influence of shared memories of a collective past, which can mobilise and unite its members. According to him can a collective identity come into being only through remembering the past.

Another source of growing legitimacy is simple existence of state structures. As Hobsbawm writes, even though forming worker class was against politics of ruling classes its politicisation was framed by existing state structures and its dominant national ideology: “The unfolding of political and class consciousness among the workers taught them to demand and to exercise citizen rights. Its tragic paradox was that, where they had learned to assert them, it helped to plunge them willingly into the mutual massacre of World War I.” (Hobsbawm 1990, 89)

It is important to mention that popular nationalism “which emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century had no fundamental similarity to state-patriotism, even when it attached itself to it. Its basic loyalty was, paradoxically, not to ‘the country’, but only to its particular version of that country: to an ideological construct.” (Hobsbawm 1990, 93). European popular nationalism can be clearly described as ethnonationalism based on fictive kinship (Gemeinschaft) rather than loyalty to state (Gesellschaft). It was marked by growing xenophobia and ended in world wars.

Actual (Ethno)nationalism and Anti-Globalization

I would say that the role of popular ethnonationalism at the end of 20th and beginning of 21st century in Europe has not changed over time. Technological development in communication and transport put bigger masses of people into move again. The number of legal immigrants admitted for a permanent residence in the US at the beginning of the 21st century is very close to a peak from the beginning of the 20th century. This time it will hopefully not be followed by a drop-down caused by World Wars and a Cold war (See Figure 1 in Attachments).

Campaign posters for the European treaty are affixed in streets near ParisSituation in Europe is even more dramatic, because European countries population growth originated in internal population boom and led also to considerable emigration waves, thence they were rather emigrant countries during their modern history (Jopke 1998). After the World Wars  migration in Europe is on the rise, foremost in direction from the south to north-west. When communism in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Iron Curtain fell “(…)fears of large-scale emigration from Central and Eastern Europe have been a major concern for policy makers in Western Europe. But the reality of the past decade is that internal migration flows between the countries of this region have accounted for far greater movement in terms of numbers than emigration from the region to Western Europe or North America. » wrote OECD in 2001. Also at the beginning of 1990’s were culminating reforms of European Community, which led to creation of the European Union and a single currency, the euro, with a signature of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, marking further transfer of sovereignty from national to European level. The euro banknotes replaced state currencies in 2002, which are among the most common symbols of state identity in everyday life, according to Billig’s (1995) “banal nationalism”. Further development was marked by rejection of European constitution in referendums in Netherland and France in 2005, which occurred just a year after greatest enlargement in the history of European integration of ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004. I think that rejection of the Constitution shortly after the enlargement was not a coincidence nor did it reflect just a protest against home politics, but also fears from “Easteners”. This fear is understandable, as enlargement brought cca 75 million people to EU, representing circa 20% growth of population. Foremost extension of the free movement of people under Schengen agreement led to fears of mass immigration again. Because of world financial and so called Euro-crisis since 2008, have grown fears of resources competition. Combined development of deepening of integration (leading to transfer of sovereignty from nation state to European institutions) and broadening of integration (almost doubling number of member states) since 1990’s until present times can be seen as a threat to national and ethnic identities and boundaries. As for conservative voters clear boundaries and maintaining the status quo are more important, they support ethnonationalist parties’ more than liberals. As discussed in the previous chapter, popular ethnonationalism as an ideology of a kinship is also supported more by less educated people. It is an ideology which is traditionalist (as defined by Eriksen earlier), as it remembers constructed version of history in religion which usually also plays a role (explaining why ultra conservative Christians support ethnonationalist parties). Further flux of boundaries in today societies is caused by undermining of traditional patriarchal society, which started by feminism and continues with emancipation of non-heterosexual (LGBTQ) groups.

…rejection of the Constitution shortly after the enlargement was not a coincidence nor did it reflect just a protest against home politics, but also fears from “Easteners”…

An aerial view shows the Maidan Nezalezhnosti or Independence Square crowded by supporters of EU integration during a rally in Kiev

Maidan, December 2013

As a quintessence of this struggle can be seen actual propaganda war over Ukraine. Putin’s Russia present itself as “protecting” Russian speakers in Ukraine from a “fascist” Ukrainian government. Labelling Ukrainians as “fascist” resembles collaboration of Ukrainian nationalists during the Great Patriotic War (as Russians call the Second World War). At the same time Putin symbolised strong state as a strong father is protecting its co-ethnonationals from the decayed West (becoming “Chuck Norris of International Relations” according to Businessinsider.com 2013), which is symbolised by its leaders (presented as children) or weak bureaucrats (Globecartoon.wordpress.com 2014, Economist.com 2014b). The decadence of the EU is symbolised by its support of LGBT rights which is portrayed as support of paedophilia, a victory of transgender Conchita Wurst in Eurovision song context 2014 further supported this view (Buzzfeed.com 2013, 2014). The coalition of ethnonationalism, traditionalism, anti-globalisation with anti-European stance is illustrated by support of Putin, which he gets from right-populist parties in Europe (Economist.com 2014), be it Hungarian Jobbik or French Front National, whose leader Le Pen called Putin a good patriot (Wsj.com 2014).

Conclusion: Why do we need nationalism?

So why do we need nationalism today? First we have to look into the history of this phenomenon. Nationalism was created during transformation from agrarian-feudal into modern-democratic society. It was a product of, and further strengthened, homogenisation and democratisation, which led to more efficient usage of societal resources, because it “broke down the various localisms of region, dialect, custom, and clan, and helped to create large and powerful nation-states, with centralised markets and systems of administration, taxation, and education.” (Smith 1998, 1). Breaking of feudal privileges enabled “the third estate” to become the decisive political force and enabled democratic rule on scale of large “nation” states. Those were the most important effects on structure of societies. Therefore nationalism has important homogenisation and democratisation effects as both helps to create a political community. Prominent example was France which was able (also thanks to process of internal colonisation), to turn Dauphinois, Provencaux, Languedociens, Alsatians or Lorrainians into the Frenchmen (and Frenchwomen). This process of creation of national identity with its reinterpretation of history and creation of myths and symbols may nowadays seem obscure (illustrated by project of Skopje 2014 in Macedonia), but it happened in national states created just a century or two ago. Although it is now, thanks to the promotion of human rights, no longer possible to ban local languages as it use to happen in history, this process continues in more sublime ways until today also in “traditional nations”: “nationalist ideology is rooted in the continuous production and maintenance of imagery, practices, discourses and institutions that sustain this ideology” (Malesevic 2011, 286). Good example of this “continuous production” is banal nationalism described by Billig (1995), which stresses importance of national symbols in everyday life such as stamps, bank notes, sporting events and so on.

If we look on political effects, nationalism became probably the most important source of loyalty toward the state in modern epoch. Historically it is connected to a growth of a direct rule and disintegration of former feudal legitimacy resources such as decline of dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right and continuity of rule or religious cohesion – nationalism was able to replace them. As Eriksen (2002, 100) summarize Anderson and Cohen: “…politics cannot be purely instrumental, but must always involve symbols which have the power of creating loyalty and a feeling of belongingness.” This has very practical implications “What is more, citizens who lack a sense of shared identity and purpose, are prone to political apathy, social atomisation, and mutual irresponsibility.” (Benner in e-ir.info 2009), this is even more decisive by state which need higher degree of “sacrifice for others” from citizens to finance national welfare state. Historically, in the first phase nationalism was an elite movement. State patriotism was based on loyalty to democratic institutions and their ability to exercise “Will of People” turned it into a “state religion”. But loyalty to constitution and parliamentarianism was too abstract and distant for common people. Following expansion of suffrage to broader and lower layers of society needed a different kind of nationalism. The new version was based on terms known from everyday life, it presented nation as a broader family based on kin relationships. The ethnonationalism based rather on presupposed biological kinship was much more chauvinistic. I criticized “nationalist” parties emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century because they had no fundamental similarity to state-patriotism, even when it attached itself to it. Its basic loyalty was, paradoxically, not to ‘the country’, but only to its particular version of that country: to an ideological construct.” (Hobsbawm 1990, 93). This construct was traditionalistic, based on unrealistic mono-ethnic interpretation of history, although identification with a nation became a mass phenomenon just before the First World War and mono-ethnicity was cemented just during World Wars and the Cold war. Now the ethnic constellation in European states is set into move again, this time by immigration from another states. Ethnonationalist parties in Europe are against immigration and European integration, which are both seen as a threat to dominant ethnonationalist identity.

Foremost conservative voters, who need clear boundaries and are against change support these traditionalist parties, sometimes they are accompanied by ultra-conservative religious groups and against patriarchy endangering feminism and LGBTQ movement. Typical example of this alliance is Russian propaganda during Ukraine crisis in 2014 and support for Putin from right-populist parties. What should be done to make nationalism less dangerous? I agree with suggestions of Kaufman (2000), that European countries have to became ethno-neutral states enhancing multi-ethnicity, they have to decrease entrance criteria, while keeping their ideal ethnic core. An interesting topic for further research would be a question of European identity, which is now an elite phenomenon based on state patriotism – what would happen should it become a popular nationalism? Is there any way not to slip to European ethnonationalism?

Sources

Literature from seminar

Anderson, B. (1991): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised ed. (London: Verso).

Eriksen, T. H. (2002): Ethnicity and Nationalism 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press).

Gellner, E. (2006): Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Blackwell: Oxford, Malden and Carlton).

Hechter, M. (2000): Containing Nationalism (Oxford : Oxford University Press).

Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).

Kohn, H. (1944): The Idea of Nationalism. (New York: MacMillan).

Malesevic, S. (2011): “The Chimera of National Identity”, Nations and Nationalism17 (2), 272–290.

Özkirimli, U. (2003): The nation as an artichoke? A critique of ethnosymbolist interpretations of nationalism*. Nations and Nationalism, 9(3), 339-355.

Smith, A. D. (1996a) : “Memory and modernity: Reflections on Ernest Gellner’s Theory of Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism2 (3), 371-388.

 

Additional sources

Billig, M. (1995): Banal Nationalism (London: Sage)

Gerth, H. H., and C. Wright Mills (1964): From Max Weber: essays in sociology (New York: Oxford University Press).

Hechter, M. (1999): „Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in Bristish National Development“. Transaction Publishers.

Joppke, Ch. (1998): “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration”. World Politics, 50 (2), 266-293.

Kaufmann, E. (2000): “Liberal ethnicity: beyond liberal nationalism and minority rights”. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(6), 1086-1119.

Ohnmacht, F. Ch. (2009): “Only Trees have Roots; But Men have Legs: Nationalism’s ‘Exclusionary’ Effects and the Overcoming of Common Misconceptions”, E-International Relations (http://www.e-ir.info/2009/10/12/only-trees-have-roots-but-men-have-legs-nationalism%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98exclusionary%E2%80%99-effects-and-the-overcoming-of-common-misconceptions/ [2. 6. 2014]).

Smith, A. D. (1998) : Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge) quoted in Ohnmacht, Felix Christoph (2009): “Only Trees have Roots; But Men have Legs: Nationalism’s ‘Exclusionary’ Effects and the Overcoming of Common Misconceptions”, E-International Relations (http://www.e-ir.info/2009/10/12/only-trees-have-roots-but-men-have-legs-nationalism%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98exclusionary%E2%80%99-effects-and-the-overcoming-of-common-misconceptions/ [5. 6. 2014]).

Web-pages

Balkaninsight.com (2013): “Skopje 2014: The new face of Macedonia, updated” (http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/gallery/skopje-2014 [5. 6. 2014]).

Buzzfeed.com (2013): “The Russian Plot To Take Back Eastern Europe At The Expense Of Gay Rights” (http://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/russia-exports-homosexual-propaganda-law-in-effort-to-fight [9. 6. 2014]).

Buzzfeed.com (2014): “The Anti-Immigrant And Anti-LGBT Rhetoric That Helped Propel The Right Into The European Parliament” (http://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/the-anti-immigrant-and-anti-lgbt-rhetoric-that-helped-propel) [9. 6. 2014]).

Economist.com (2014): “Russia’s friends in black” (http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21601004-why-europes-populists-and-radicals-admire-vladimir-putin-russias-friends-black [9. 6. 2014]).

Economist.com (2014b): ” How to be good neighbours” (http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21597948-ukraine-biggest-test-eus-policy-towards-countries-its-borderlands-how-be-good [9. 6. 2014]).

OECD (2011): “Migration and EU Enlargement” (http://www.oecd.org/fr/els/mig/migrationandeuenlargement.htm [6. 6. 2014]).

Wsj.com (2014): “Vladimir Putin’s Woman in Paris” (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303903304579585792206384568 [9. 6. 2014]).

Globecartoon.wordpress.com (2014): “Tag Archives: European Union” (http://globecartoon.wordpress.com/tag/european-union/ [9. 6. 2014]).

Businessinsider.com (2013): “How Vladimir Putin Became The Chuck Norris Of International Politics” (http://www.businessinsider.com/how-vladimir-putin-became-the-chuck-norris-of-international-politics-2013-9 [22. 6. 2014]).

 

Attachments

Figure 1: Legal Immigration to the United States, FY 1820 to 2011

Note: The 1990 spike in LPR admissions reflects the one-time adjustment of newly legalized immigrants under IRCA.

Note: These data represent persons admitted for legal permanent residence during the 12-month fiscal year ending September 30 of the year designated. The total for 1976 includes both the fiscal year and transitional quarter data.

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (various years). MigrationPolicy. org (http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-united-states-new-economic-social-political-landscapes-legislative-reform [6. 6. 2014])