Autor: Daniel Soukop (Department of War Studies, King’s College, London)

Events connected with Middle Eastern affairs make it to the headlines more often than not, but only a few of them have the potential of completely changing the rules of the game. Since we entered a new millennium, we witnessed arguably three of these events – the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the fall of the Tunisian President Ben Ali in January 2011 which started the Arab Spring. One of the root causes of the second of these crucial events can be traced to 17 September 2002.

On this day, the White House published the National Security Strategy of 2002, the first official list of security aims of the new George W. Bush administration. This document should be remembered as a significant shift in the foreign and security policy of the United States because it incorporated several neoconservative approaches very new to the U.S. security planning.1 These innovations are today collectively known as the ‘Bush Doctrine’.

The most important core parts of this new security approach were arguably the support of pre-emptive strikes and unilateralism: “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”2 Only a single application of the Bush Doctrine was needed for it to be always remembered in the annals of history.

On 20 March 2003, the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing executed a full-scale invasion on the Iraqi soil, even though three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council openly opposed this move. Since then, there has been a vivid discussion among academics, policy makers and others how much damage did this invasion cause to the United Nations.

This paper works with two theses. Both represent the extreme answer on the mentioned question. According to the first one, the damage to the United Nations has been severe and it paralyzed the organization for years. And according to the second one, there was no damage at all and some might even claim the Iraq Invasion has benefited the UN. This essay will critically assess both of these extreme perspectives and conclude that neither of them is close to the reality.

The last part of the essay will focus on how much harm has the Iraq War done to the United Nations. The closing argumentation of this paper is that even though the overall activity of the United Nations has not been affected, the Iraq War has indeed created an atmosphere of mistrust among the permanent members of the Security Council. While this has not prevented the executive body of the UN to pass several important resolutions, it had eventually led, together with the Libyan no-fly zone resolution of 2011, to a deadlock over the civil war in Syria, which one might call a substantial damage to regional and world peace.

This is a reminder that the aim of this essay is not to answer whether the Iraq War was legal, legitimate or justified. Although some arguments of both sides will be briefly presented in the first part of the paper, the objective of this discussion overview is only to explain the division among the permanent members of the Security Council.

The ‘substantial damage’ thesis

While the United States and the United Kingdom executed the invasion, many members of the Security Council openly protested. Even the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan later publicly denounced the war as an illegal act: “Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.“3 To understand the division in the United Nations, one has to look at the both sides of the argument.

Since the end of the Second World War, armed conflict against another state has been considered a breach against international law. However, the Charter of the United Nations knows two exceptions to this rule. Its article 41 allows the use of force when the Security Council approved such action, and the article 51 gives member states the right to self-defence.4 Proponents of the Iraq war claim both of these conditions were met before the Iraq War began.

According to the pro-war camp, the United States had the mandate to invade Iraq because the resolution 678 was reactivated. This resolution, adopted on 29 November 1990, authorized member states to use all means necessary to uphold and implement resolution 660, which demanded Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwaiti soil, and all subsequent relevant resolutions.5 The most important subsequent resolution was 687, adopted on 3 April 1991. Among else, it demanded Iraq to unconditionally destroy or remove its chemical and biological weapons, including means of their development, and ballistic missiles with range over 150 kilometres.67

This leads to 8 November 2002 when all fifteen members of the Security Council8 unanimously adopted the resolution 1441. The document, under Chapter VII of the United Nations, included among else these statements and provisions:

  • Iraq was still in a material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687,

  • Iraq was afforded a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,

  • Iraq was supposed to provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems, and

  • Iraq was warned that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.9

In the time period between the resolution 1441 and the invasion, the head of the UN monitoring team in Iraq Hans Blix delivered his assessment at the Security Council three times. On the first occasion, on 27 January, Blix stated that Saddam Hussein does not cooperate and that it seems unlikely he would anytime soon. On 14 February 2003, he said that Iraq had made some progress, but there was still a lot of room for improvement and some of the highlighted issues have still not been accounted for, particularly the potential anthrax and VX production. Finally, on 7 March, Blix testified that Iraq’s cooperation efforts have increased rapidly, that there is no evidence suggesting Iraq still has chemical or biological weapons in possession, and that the British allegations that Iraq received yellow cake uranium from Niger cannot be verified.10

The U.S.-led coalition did not believe Saddam Hussein’s sudden change in heart. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair speculated that the French might have cornered Blix and convinced him that he would have blood on his hands if his reports remained negative as the first one.11 Thus from the perspective of the pro-war side, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated numerous UN resolutions, including resolutions 687 and 1441,12 and that has reactivated the resolution 678.

The United States also claimed that it acted in self-defence and that the Iraq War was a preventive strike against an aggressor. The White House has put a lot of effort into convincing the international community that Saddam Hussein was a serious security threat. For instance, Foreign Secretary Colin Powell presented the Security Council satellite images of Iraqi facilities producing WMDs,13 or brought a vial with ‘anthrax’ to the Council room.14

The United States and the United Kingdom faced a strong opposition. Both France15 and Russia16 claimed any unilateral military operation without the approval of the Security Council would seriously endanger world security. China seemed more neutral, although always protecting the principle of non-interference into domestic affairs.17 One of the strongest opponents was also Germany, although at that time not a member of the Security Council. The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder even built his election campaign on the opposition to the Iraq War.18

Many experts on international law joined the war protesters.19 To name one example, Christian Dominicé from the Institute de Droit International in Ghent believes the resolution 1441 did not permit the invasion. In his opinion, the ‘serious consequences’ were supposed to be defined by the Security Council in a following resolution, not unilaterally by the United States. Furthermore, the talk about the legality of preventive strikes seems ludicrous, as “no sign of such a threat as been found.” If this argumentation was accepted, it would create a dangerous precedent for the future.20

In conclusion, the Iraq War created a significant division between the supporters and the opponents. But more importantly, this crisis planted a seed of mistrust which echoes in the Security Council even today. While most of the Council members meant the resolution 1441 to be only a warning, the U.S.-led coalition interpreted it in a different way and used the resolution to justify its invasion.

It should be noted that the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, said at the Council meeting before the vote: “As we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force.”21 The same message was repeated by the UK ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock: “There is no ‘automaticity’ in this resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion.”22

This mistrust was soon projected in the negotiations about the Iranian nuclear programme. There is no doubt that France, Russia and other Security Council members became cautious about what language do the resolutions contain. During the remaining years of the George W. Bush administration, the UN Security Council passed five resolutions regarding the Iranian nuclear programme,23 but none included 1441-style phrases like ‘final opportunity’ or ‘serious consequences’. Simply put, the Council made sure the United States would get no space to interpret something as legal basis for starting a new war. Did this division, however, affect the operationality of the United Nations?

Supporters of the ‘substantial damage’ might point out at the UN inactivity in the case of the genocide in Darfur which happened only a year after the Iraq invasion. A convenient explanation would be the fresh division of the Security Council. However, a more plausible reason of this inexcusable passivity seems to be rather the increased Russian and Chinese economic interests in Sudan.24

A strong countering argument to this thesis is the overall work of the United Nations, which does not seem to be affected by the Iraq War and the consequent split within the Security Council. In particular, the Security Council passed 726 new resolutions since 20 March 2003 when the war began25 and the overall number of resolutions per year seems unaffected.26 Also the bi-annual budget of the United Nations does not reflect any sign of an UN paralysis.27

The Security Council was also able to pass several resolutions concerning important issues. For instance, in the middle of the Arab Spring, the Council adopted resolution 1973 which established a no-fly zone over Libya28 which effectively stopped Col. Qaddafi from crushing the opposition.29 Another example would be the handling of the crisis in Mali 2012-2013, caused by the Tuarek rebels and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The Security Council first gave its support of the French intervention in Mali in early 201330 and bolstered its success by deployment of peacekeeping forces (MINUSMA) a few months later.31

There is also no empirical evidence to suggest that the overall work of the United Nations has been influenced by the Iraq War. Since the conflict began, the UN started more than a dozen of new peacekeeping missions across the globe. Just to name a few, the Sudan mission (UNMIS) helped with the referendum in South Sudan in early 2011 and with the subsequent independence of the region; the Timor-Leste mission (UNMIT) bolstered the government and ensured the stability of the newest member of the UN; and the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH) is helping with state-building and access to humanitarian aid. The UN also formed a peacekeeping mission in Syria (UNSMIS), which can definitely be considered as a difficult decision requiring some form of unity of the Security Council, but the mission was eventually suspended due to escalating violence of the civil war.

The family of the United Nations continued to grow. For instance, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive directorate (CTED) and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force were established in 2005 to help member states to implement good practices and standards in countering terrorism, insurgency and other forms of asymmetric warfare. Also in 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission was given mandate to focus on reconstruction and institution-building efforts of member states in need of its support. And to name of the most recent projects, UN-Women was founded in 2010 to deal with gender equality in the most challenging regions in the world. There are additionally dozens of funds, programmes, research and training institutes, and specialized agencies under the UN system which work as efficiently today as they were before the Iraq War.

The ‘substantial damage’ thesis can be therefore declared as untrue. Although the Security Council faces significant division after the Iraq War and although there have been planted seeds of mistrust among its members, the international organization remained operational and on certain levels effective.

The ‘no damage’ thesis

This thesis claims the United Nations did not suffer any damage at all, but actually benefited from the Iraq War. The most vocal argument is that the Coalition of the Willing defeated the stubborn UN bureaucracy and walked the walk, instead of just talking the talk, as some other members of the Security Council preferred. According to this point of view, the U.S.-led alliance served as law enforcement force against a dictator who never had the intention to comply with UN resolutions, and this served as a warning to other rogue states in the world who would like to follow Saddam Hussein’s footsteps.

David Trimble, a British diplomat who helped to secure the Belfast Agreement and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, is one of the supporters of this thesis. He claims: “The UN had been weakened badly enough by the failures of the 1990s. It again set its hand to trying to carry through its will in this matter, and it had to succeed. If it did not, enormous damage would have been done to the possibility that the UN can be credible in the future, and that will have implications for world peace. The paradox is that those who want peace and a UN that succeeds in the world had, therefore, to support the use of force when that became necessary.”32

President George W. Bush repeatedly claimed the little effectiveness of the United Nations was one of the most important arguments for the Iraq War: “We want the United Nations to be effective. We want the resolutions of the world’s most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime.”33

The American President also claimed that Saddam Hussein is the unilateralist and that he is the one who is responsible for the bad connotation the UN received during this crisis: “The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?”34

According to some, the current UN system is obsolete, therefore it risks of eventually becoming unimportant in the future of international relations. One of the proponents of a UN reform is José Ramos-Horta, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He claims that “the existing UN collective security mechanism is out-dated and undemocratic, a product of relic of the Cold War that no longer meets the challenges of today’s world and does not reflect today’s economic, demographic and strategic realities. There is an obvious need for reform.”35

Next to heated arguments, one should not forget about numerous crises which were not prevented by the United Nations. Most notably, the UN has been under intense pressure since the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, because it did so little to prevent these atrocities.36 Some people, especially including members of the Bush administration, tried to paint the Iraq crisis as another disaster in the world which, this time, had to be averted.

There can be no speculations whether or not Saddam Hussein was a dangerous man. He started two wars – against Iran and later against Kuwait, he massacred his own people with chemical weapons,37 and he caused an international crisis leading to the unprecedented multilateral military operation in 1991.

After the operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein was ordered to dispose of his chemical and biological arsenal, and make significant changes to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme.38 In the following years, Saddam Hussein continued to resist some of the obligations imposed by the UN. Although the claims about an active chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme in were based on bad intelligence and misinterpretations, stocks of 1980s chemical weapons have actually been discovered on Iraqi soil in recent years.39

Although no evidence does not seem suggest Saddam Hussein was a threat to international peace and stability in the year 2003, it can be concluded he was indeed a potential security hazard in the long run. And there is only little doubt about his non-compliance with UN resolutions. This would support the ‘no damage’ thesis.

There was also the argument that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would send a clear signal to other ‘rogue states’. Next in line were especially the other two members of the so-called ‘axis of evil’, e.g. Iran and North Korea. There have been a many supporters of military strikes especially against Iran and it seems plausible there actually were prepared war scenarios. For instance, Bennett Ramberg, who served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs during the George W. Bush administration, actively proposed a combination of an Osirak-style of an attack and a limited war on ground.40

The call for sending a message to other rebelling countries is, however, the strongest argument against the ‘no damage’ thesis. More than ten years and several UN resolutions after the Iraq War, the Iranian theocracy still has an active nuclear programme, it still supports various movements which the United States, the Europe Union or the United Nations considers to be terrorists, and there seem to be no significant change on the human rights front.

Just after the start of the Iraq War, Iran did the direct opposite what the ‘no damage’ thesis suggested. In 2005, a hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the President of Iran. He became famous for his statement that “Israel should be wiped off the map,” although this quote was evidently badly translated and misinterpreted.41 Nonetheless, Iran came to the West with rapprochement only ten years after the Iraq invasion. This was clearly not the result of the fall of Saddam Hussein, but mainly a synergy of two factors – Iranian economy struggling under international sanctions and the initiative of the new moderate President Hassan Rouhani.42

Not much has changed with North Korea either. The regime remains strongly isolated from the world, repeatedly tests its ballistic missiles, and does not seem to give in to the international pressure and sanctions anytime soon. Furthermore, North Korea also tested its first nuclear warhead in 2006. The fall of Saddam Hussein had apparently no positive consequences on the everlasting tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

One could argue that the ‘no damage’ thesis could work if the Iraq invasion became a success. In other words, if Iraq soon became a stable, prosperous state with working democratic mechanisms, enforced protection of civil and human rights, and unchallenged rule of law. However, and this should go without saying, Iraq War was clearly a failure, especially from the long-term perspective. Iraq never came close to real and unquestionable stability.

Sectarian violence and pictures of people dying in the streets became a part of daily life in Iraq.43 People even started to make jokes about suicide bombers in order to cope with the everyday’s deadly threat waiting on them in public places.44 And today, Iraq is on the brink of disintegration – between the Islamic State in the west, the Kurds in the north, and the Shia in the south-east.

Some might have seen this scenario coming since the Iraq invasion. In 1991, American security advisors warned President George H. W. Bush not to overthrow Saddam Hussein. They argued Iraq would sooner or later give in to the sectarian division within the country and split up into three new state entities.45 One might therefore speculate that this scenario might have been inevitable.

It is thus quite difficult not to paint the Iraq invasion of 2003 as an utter failure, particularly from the long-term perspective. It might be true that the UN bureaucracy was successfully defeated, but the result is far from being when the United States wanted. Additionally, neither Iran nor North Korea got intimidated by the fall of Saddam Hussein and continued to defy the international pressure. It can be therefore concluded that the ‘no damage’ thesis does not reflect the reality.

How much harm has been done?

The previous two parts of this essay successfully disproved both extreme theses. The logical consequence would be to lean towards the middle way. In other words, the United Nations suffered some damage, but which cannot be defined by the word ‘substantial’. One question still remains, though. How much damage did the UN suffer?

Unfortunately, the answer cannot fit into a single word or sentence as the problematic is indeed complicated. On one hand, the overall work of the United Nations and its agencies does not seem to be affected by the Iraq War at all. The Security Council still has the capability to pass resolutions – both in numbers and in effectively addressing most of the pressing issues. More than a dozen new peacekeeping missions have been started since March 2003 and there are currently sixteen missions on ground.46 Furthermore, not even the bi-annual budget of the United Nations has been affected by the Iraq War. It has, in fact, grown over the past few years.

On the other hand, the permanent members of the Security Council had a really strong argumentation about the legality and legitimacy of the Iraq War. This has consequently influenced the language of new resolutions, especially those concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. Hypothetically, the sanctions against Iran could have been even tougher and the rapprochement might have come earlier. The Security Council just wanted to assure itself that the United States would not play a game with words again which could lead to a new war. Nonetheless, this division did not prevent the Security Council from adopting a number of important resolutions concerning difficult issues like wars in Mali and Libya.

If this essay was written before the Arab Spring, its conclusion would probably say that the Iraq War has done only little damage which was eventually fixed by time. This is not the case, however. In 2011, the Security Council passed resolution 1973 which established a no-fly zone over Libya. The aim of this resolution was mainly to protect civilians from the Libyan armed forces.47

This was the first time since the Iraq War when the Security Council decided to use the phrase ‘all necessary measures’. Consequently, the NATO forces took charge of implementing this resolution and in the end helped the opposition even more. The rebel forces eventually gained the upper hand in the civil war, prevailed and killed Muammar Gaddafi. This would have probably not have happened without the help of the NATO forces. Needless to say, this was not the aim of the resolution.

History repeated itself. The Security Council passed a resolution meaning something, but the United States and its allies interpreted it in another way. One might recall the infamous saying: “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” This resulted in Russian and Chinese vetoes of four resolutions concerning the civil war in Syria,48 arguably the most challenging security issue of the contemporary world.

In conclusion, the United Nations did not in general suffer any substantial damage. It is still an effective organization capable of deploying peacekeeping missions, adopting new resolutions, and doing the necessary small work on ground. However, the dual interpretations of resolutions concerning the wars in Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011 together led to the current Security Council deadlock which is preventing the organization to stop the civil war in Syria. Although it is difficult to call this a substantial damage to the United Nations as such, because it concerns only a single issue out of a million, it is definitely a huge blow to international peace and stability.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1: Range of Iraqi ballistic missiles

Source: Colin Powel, “Iraq: Denial and Deception“, The White House, 5 February 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html

Appendix 2: Resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council 1990-2014

Source: United Nations, Official Document Service of the United Nations (ODS). http://documents.un.org/

Appendix 3: Annual UN Budget 1990-2013

Source: Brett D. Schaefer, “The History of the Bloated U.N. Budget: How the U.S. Can Rein It In”, The Heritage Foundation, 2 April 2012. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/the-history-of-the-bloated-un-budget-how-the-us-can-rein-it-in

Appendix 4: The No-Fly Zone over Libya in 2011 (Operation Odyssey Dawn)

Source: Global Security, “Libya Civil War – No Fly Zone”, Global Security, accessed 22 January 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/libya-civil-war-nfz.htm

Appendix 5: Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2008-2013

Source: United Nations Iraq, “Resources: Civilian Casualties”, accessed 22 January 2015. http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=159&Itemid=633&lang=en

Notes

1 For instance Ian Shapiro did a fine work on comparing the National Security Strategy of 2002 with previous U.S. security planning. The innovations include: global reach, no time limitation, unilateralism, pre-emptive strikes, overthrowing a dictator is a sufficient reason to go to war, and no one can stay neutral in the War on Terror.
Ian Shapiro,
Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp 31-45.
2
 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 17 September 2002, p. 6. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf
3
 BBC News, “Excerpts: Annan Interview”, BBC News, 16 September 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661640.stm
4

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. 24 October 1945. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
5
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/678, 29 November 1990.
6
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/687, 3 April 1991.
7

See Appendix 1.
8

In 2002, these were the members of the UN Security Council: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, People’s Republic China, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Guinea, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, and Syria.
9

United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1441, 8 November 2002.
10

John Kampfner, Blair‘s Wars (London: Free Press, 2003), pp 258, 271, 281-282.
11

Ibidem, p 272.
12

The White House, “Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions”, accessed 21 January 2015. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect2.html
13

Colin Powel, “Iraq: Denial and Deception“, The White House, 5 February 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html
14

BBC News, “Americans Weigh Iraq Evidence”, BBC News, 5 February 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2730755.stm
15

Jan Eichler, Terrorism and Wars at the Beginning of the 21st Century (Prague: Karolinum, 2007), p 268.
16

Global Policy Forum, “US, Britain and Spain Abandon Resolution”, Global Policy Forum, 17 March 2003. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35373.html
17

John Keegan, The Iraq War (Prague: BETA-Dobrovský, 2005), pp 101-102.
18

Ibidem, p 94.
19

Jim Lobe, “Law Groups Say US Invasion Illegal”, Global Policy Forum, 21 March 2003. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35756.html
20

Christian Dominicé, “Some Legal Aspects of the Military Operation in Iraq”, in: Irwin Abrams and Wang Gungwu (eds.), The Iraq War and its Consequences: Thoughts of Nobel Peace Laureates and Eminent Scholars (London: World Scientific Publishing: 2003), pp 137-143.
21

United Nations Security Council, document S/PV.4644, 8 November 2002, p 3.
22

Ibidem, p 4.
23

United Nations Security Council, Resolutions S/RES/1696 (2006), S/RES/1737 (2006), S/RES/1747 (2007), S/RES/1803 (2008), and S/RES/1835 (2008).
24

Eyal Mayroz, “Ever Again? The United States, Genocide Suppression, and the Crisis in Darfur”, Journal of Genocide Research 10, no 3 (September 2008), pp 365-366.
25

United Nations, Official Document Service of the United Nations (ODS). http://documents.un.org/
26

See Appendix 2.
27

See Appendix 3.
28

See Appendix 4.
29

United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011.
30

United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2085, 20 December 2012.
31

United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/2100, 25 April 2013.
32

David Trimble, “The United Nations Left Us No Option But to Act”, in: Irwin Abrams and Wang Gungwu (eds.), The Iraq War and its Consequences: Thoughts of Nobel Peace Laureates and Eminent Scholars (London: World Scientific Publishing: 2003), p 12.
33

Patrick E. Tyler, “Bush Names Hussein Public Enemy no. 1”, The New York Times, 13 September 2002. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/13/international/13ASSE.html
34
 Ibidem.
35
 José Ramos-Horta, “The Post-Cold War and the Unipolar World: Can the U.S. Lead?”, in: Irwin Abrams and Wang Gungwu (eds.), The Iraq War and its Consequences: Thoughts of Nobel Peace Laureates and Eminent Scholars (London: World Scientific Publishing: 2003), p 62.
36
 Richard Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter Szstem of War Prevention? Reflections on the Iraq War”, in: Irwin Abrams and Wang Gungwu (eds.), The Iraq War and its Consequences: Thoughts of Nobel Peace Laureates and Eminent Scholars (London: World Scientific Publishing: 2003), p 209.
37

The Iraqi armed forces attacked the village of Halabja in north-eastern part of the country on 15 March 1988. According to BBC reporter John Simpson, who arrived to the site six days after the incident, the army tackled the site repeatedly with heavy artillery, aircraft, mustard gas, nerve agents, and cyanide. Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb: And Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: Granta Books, 2004), pp 60-63.
38

United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/687, 3 April 1991.
39

C. J. Chivers, “The Secret Casualties of Iraq’s Abandoned Chemical Weapons”, New York Times, 14 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html
40

Bennett Ramberg, “Position: The Military Option”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 66, no. 6 (November/December 2010), p 127.
41

Glen Kessler, “Did Ahmadinejad really say Israel should be ‘wiped off the map’?”, The Washington Post, 5 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be-wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML_blog.html
42

Masoud Kazemzadeh, “Hassan Rouhani’s Election and Its Consequences for American Foreign Policy”, American Foreign Policy Interests 36, no. 2 (March 2014), 127-137, pp 135-136.
43

See Appendix 5.
44

Tomáš Raděj, Irácké povstání v letech 2003-2009: Strategie, taktika a ideologie islámských radikálních a nacionalistických uskupení (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2010), p 139.
45

George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp 450-488.
46
 United Nations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations”, accessed 23 January 2014. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml
47
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011.
48

Both Russia and China vetoed resolutions S/2011/612, S/2012/77, S/2012/538, and S/2014/348. United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides, “Security Council – Veto List”, accessed 23 January 2014. http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto